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THE WILLOWBROOK WARS. By David J. Rothmant and
Sheila M. Rothman.2 New York: Harper & Row. 1984. Pp.
405. $27.95.
PhilipP. Frickey3 and David I. Levine4
This book tells the story of the Willowbrook State School, an
abysmal state institution for the mentally retarded located in New
York City, and of the litigation that forced the state to move many
residents from the institution into small community group homes.
It recounts the history of one of the most well-known institutional
reform cases in the country. The book also provides an account of
the implementation of a complex consent decree. It is worth reading by students and teachers of constitutional law alike.
Surprisingly, the book delivers more than it initially seems to
promise. Its jacket (although not its cover) contains a subtitle-A
Decade of Struggle for Social Justice-sure to raise the hackles of
any reader concerned about judicial activism. Such a reader would
not be assuaged by the authors' descriptions of themselves in the
first chapter. For example, David Rothman admits being "more
deeply involved in policy questions than most historians."s He is on
the boards of the New York Civil Liberties Union and the Mental
Health Law Project.6 Similarly, Sheila Rothman acknowledges
having "little patience for discovering the reading of a constitutional clause that would convince a federal judge to intervene when
the evidence of an institution's inhumanity should spark some sort
of ameliorative action."1 She is "[b]y training ... a social worker
who recognized that a lengthy confinement in a custodial institution
was almost always psychologically destructive."s In other words,
she has a strong bias in favor of deinstitutionalization, one of the
most sensitive issues in the Willowbrook controversy.
I. Bernard Schoenberg Professor of Social Medicine, Professor of History, and Director of the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine at the College of Physicians and
Surgeons, Columbia University.
2. Research Scholar, Center for the Social Sciences, Columbia University.
3. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
4. Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
5. D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, supra, at 3.
6. These affiliations arose out of the publication of his 1971 book The Discovery of the
Asylum, a study of the origins of prisons and mental hospitals. /d. at 3-4.
7. !d. at 7.
8. !d.
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One ought not judge this book either by its jacket or by the
authors' candid self-descriptions. The Rothmans provide a reasonably careful and generally balanced look at both the Willowbrook
story and some of the larger issues in institutional reform litigation.
What of the subtitle on the jacket? In one sense, it is probably accurate: the Willowbrook "wars" did range over a decade, and that
institution was so shocking that only the most hardened disciple of
Felix Frankfurter or Alexander Bickel could cringe at labeling this
litigation a "struggle for social justice." In any event, dispassionate
or even cynical readers should not allow the subtitle to irritate
them, for they can learn much from the Rothmans if they ignore
what is probably only Harper & Row's effort to sell more books.
I

In 1972 Willowbrook was a disaster. It was grossly overcrowded with retarded children and adults. Staffing was minimal.
Staff pay was so low and working conditions so unpleasant that absenteeism was rampant. The institution was filthy, and hepatitis
and shigella were common. Residents moved about naked or in tatters; feces often adorned the walls. Not only were therapy and medical care largely nonexistent, residents commonly suffered injury
due to the acts of themselves or others. In short, Willowbrook was
a human dumping ground.
The Rothmans attribute these conditions in part to the orientation of the psychiatrists in charge of New York State's Department
of Mental Hygiene. According to the authors, these doctors all had
a triage mentality about the allocation of their admittedly scarce
medical resources. The doctors saw the Willowbrook residents,
many of whom were severely or profoundly retarded, as incurables
akin "to the senile, the chronic schizophrenic, the brain-damaged
alcoholic." These physicians "believed that available funds had to
go first to the hopeful-to the curable mentally ill."9 This result
was reinforced, the Rothmans suggest, by their
deep-seated prejudice against the retarded .... [P)sychiatrists had been taught that
the failure of their discipline, more particularly the failure of the mental hospital, to
deliver on its promise to cure patients was mostly due to the inability to separate the
... treatable from the non treatable. . . . For psychiatry to achieve its proper rank in
medicine, it had to maintain a rigid distinction between rehabilitation and custody. . . . Put in this context, Willowbrook was the price that had to be paid for
advancement elsewhere. Squander resources on its incurables, and psychiatry in
general and the treatable patients in particular would never progress. 10
9.
10.

/d. at 25.
/d. at 25-26.
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The charge that the retarded were willfully neglected is explosive,
but the Rothmans present their indictment credibly, buttressed by
citations to lectures, interviews, and writings by, with, and about
two of the three named psychiatrists. 11
A few reform-minded physicians and staff working at Willowbrook, along with some parents of children who resided there, began the effort to improve conditions. Picketing and marches got
some media attention but no results. Dissatisfied staff arranged for
a raid on the institution by television journalist Geraldo Rivera and
a camera crew. In typical fashion, though, after the media exposed
and castigated Willowbrook for a while, the story was dropped. Finally, Willowbrook parents, sympathetic professionals, and civil liberties lawyers-including Mental Health Law Project co-founder
Bruce Ennis, who would become lead counsel-participated in a
"Policy and Action" retreat. All concerned shared "a widespread
and well-warranted distrust of going to the New York legislature[,]
the body that had neglected Willowbrook for years."12 The consensus was that a lawsuit was the only practicable remedy.
Even before the complaint was filed, a major issue arose concerning the nature of the relief to be sought for Willowbrook residents. Should the federal court simply be asked to require the state
to run a clean, safe and habitable institution? This was the goal of
many Willowbrook parents, who could not take their children back
home and knew of no acceptable alternative to institutionalization.
Others, however, including many professionals in retardation-related fields, had a more radical vision: the retarded had a "right" to
live in the least restrictive residential alternative possible. To these
reformers, even the severely retarded should be treated like ordinary people to the extent possible. Thus, these persons pushed for
"normalization," under which the retarded would be returned to
the community to live in small group homes or in foster care that
would allow them to experience life in the real world. Based on
intuition more than scientific proof, community placement advocates asserted that the retarded could not progress in any large institution; even severely retarded people needed the stimulation of daily
life activities, not merely custodial care.
The civil liberties lawyers embraced normalization as compatible with their abiding distrust of large institutions and of the segregation of the powerless. In the end, the lawyers' choice was critical
because they were in command of remedial as well as litigation
strategy. During the preremedial stages, however, these differences
I I.
12.

/d. at 25-26 (footnote at 381 ).
/d. at 59.
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of opinion about the proper relief to be sought did not sharply divide the parents from other supporters, in part because everyone
agreed something had to be done and in part because it was not then
clear that such a sharp dichotomy in remedial goals existed among
those in the plaintiff camp.
The Rothmans report that the plaintiffs' attorneys purposely
filed the complaint along with a motion for emergency relief in federal court late on a Friday afternoon, operating on the myth "that
liberal judges work longer and harder, and thus are more likely to
be in chambers" at that time.IJ Instead of drawing Judge Jack
Weinstein, whom they most desired, however, the case ended up
with Judge Orrin Judd, a moderate Nixon appointee. Early in the
litigation, plaintiffs' attorneys asserted that their clients had a constitutional "right to treatment" that was being denied at Willowbrook. No doubt some supporters of the litigation-many
Willowbrook parents among them-hoped that this doctrine would
lead the federal court to turn Willowbrook into a true educational
and treatment facility rather than a warehouse for those who came
out last in triage. The Rothmans note, however, that "[m]any lawyers, including Ennis, wanted to use the doctrine as a way of emptying mental hospitals; confident that the states would never be able
to make the institutions therapeutic, they saw right to treatment as
a tool for prying patients loose from horrendous settings."l4 Again
it seems that the mixed and somewhat conflicting interests of those
involved in the litigation were not fully recognized, much less
resolved.
Judge Judd rejected any constitutional right to treatment. He
did discover a constitutional right to protection from harm, however, found it violated at Willowbrook, and ordered some immediate improvements. The result pleased no one; the state resented the
intrusion, and at least some on the other side of the suit feared that
in the long run Judd would only "make Willowbrook into a safer
warehouse."1s The parties trusted their own bargaining skills more
than the judge, and after months of negotiations the plaintiffs and
the state agreed upon a consent decree.
Among other things, the consent decree created a panel to
monitor compliance consisting of seven persons-two chosen by the
state, three by the plaintiffs, and two by the panel itself. Through a
combination of shrewdness by plaintiffs' counsel and inattention by
the state, proponents of deinstitutionalization filled not only the
13.
14.
15.

/d. at 64-65.
/d. at 54 n. •.
/d. at 90.
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three spots chosen by the plaintiffs, but also the two positions
picked by the panel. Although a variety of disputes arose during
the period in which the monitoring panel was in existence, none
approached the importance of the question of the degree to which
the consent decree obligated the state to place Willowbrook residents in the community. The Rothmans report that although the
state and plaintiffs' counsel had agreed on the language of the consent decree concerning deinstitutionalization, they failed to appreciate their differing approaches to this goal. The state, in essence,
thought it was obligating itself to the use of group homes to the
extent feasible; plaintiffs' counsel, on the other hand, were committed to community placement of every Willowbrook resident and the
closing of that institution. In the end, it was the monitoring panel's
strong commitment to deinstitutionalization, not the bare language
of the consent decree or any contested judicial order, that by 1983
resulted in half of the plaintiff class-2600 persons-being in community placement. (Twelve percent had died, seventeen percent remained in a Willowbrook still objectionable on many grounds but
nonetheless improved due to the litigation, and the others were in
other institutions.)
The state's efforts to comply with the consent decree and with
the monitoring panel's edicts illuminate many of the difficult
problems of achieving institutional reform in modern America. According to the Rothmans, a number of capable individuals-many
either brought into state government or reassigned for this purpose-performed invaluable service in implementing the consent
decree. However, they faced a hostile state bureaucracy that was
threatened by the changing conditions. Indeed, bureaucratic reorganization was required-the creation of the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (OMRDD) separate from
the entrenched Department of Mental Hygiene-to free the hands
of highly placed officials committed to complying with the consent
decree. Some of the Willowbrook staff, fearful of losing their jobs as
a result of deinstitutionalization, did what they could to sabotage
community placement. But even without unusual bureaucratic fetters the task of implementing community placement was formidable. State officials cajoled nonprofit organizations that had never
before cared for the retarded to run foster care programs and group
homes. The officials led these groups through the maze of state requirements, helped locate sites for group homes, and did their best
to quell community opposition.
The Rothmans assert that, in the end, the deinstitutionalization program was remarkably successful. No group home, once
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open, was the object of vandalism or even picketing; the homes offered decent accommodations and services in acceptable neighborhoods; there was no evidence that group homes decreased
surrounding property values or otherwise damaged neighborhoods;
vigilant monitoring of the homes demonstrated that the wide majority provided services of high quality to their residents. Most important, and perhaps most surprising to the casual observer, is the
Rothmans' clear conclusion that the retarded-even those severely
afflicted-are functioning much better and learning many more
"life skills" in this setting.
Along the way, however, the judicial commitment to institutional reform waivered dramatically. In 1980 the New York legislature refused to continue funding for the monitoring panel. Judge
John Bartels, who had taken over the case after the death of Judge
Judd, ordered the governor and OMRDD to fund the panel or suffer contempt. The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that, in requesting legislative appropriations for the panel, the governor had
fulfilled his duty under the decree to use best efforts "to ensure the
full and timely financing of [the] judgment, including, if necessary,
submission of appropriate budget requests to the legislature."I6 In
further litigation, plaintiffs requested a special master11 to take over
the functions of the defunct panel. The state countered with a request to modify the decree to allow it to place Willowbrook residents transitionally in settings larger than the ten to fifteen bed limit
originally agreed upon. The district court granted the plaintiffs' request and denied the state's, but again the Second Circuit reversed.Is The court of appeals upheld the lower court's
appointment of a special master, but determined that the state's requested modification should be granted. It stressed that even in the
context of the modification of a consent decree, substantial deference must be paid to the professional judgment of state officers.
This judicial reluctance to overrule a state's preference for institutionalization rather than community placement finds support in
a prior Supreme Court opinioni 9 and is likely to continue in the
future. 2 o Indeed, in a later decision the Second Circuit has seem16. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 163 (2d Cir.
1980) (emphasis added).
17. See generally Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Special Mas·
ters in Federal Institutional Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C.D. L. REV.
753 (1984).
18. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 277 (1983).
19. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
20. The Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985), reinforces a limited judicial role in scrutinizing treatment of the insti-
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ingly slammed the door on any constitutional right to a least restrictive residential alternative.21
The court recognized that the
institutionalized retarded have certain constitutional rights in the
institution-the right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical
care, safe conditions, freedom from undue bodily restraint, and
training sufficient to preserve basic self-care skills from deteriorating. The court emphatically rejected, however, "an entitlement to
community placement or a 'least restrictive environment' under the
federal constitution."22 Rather, the Constitution is satisfied if "a
decision to keep residents [institutionalized] is a rational decision
based on professional judgment."23
II

Since the germinal article by Professor Chayes in 1976,24 a host
tutionalized retarded. In Cleburne Living Center, the Court refused to apply some version of
heightened equal protection scrutiny to classifications based on mental retardation, despite
the fact that the institutionalized retarded share some of the same characteristics as other
groups that have received special judicial solicitude under the equal protection clause. This
deference to legislative prerogatives concerning the retarded strongly reinforces the 1984 decision of the Second Circuit in Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, see notes
21-23 infra and accompanying text, which rejected any constitutional right of the retarded to
live in the least restrictive environment.
The Court in Cleburne Living Center did, however, invoke the rational basis test to im·alidate a municipal ordinance requiring a special use permit for the operation of a group home
for the retarded. The Court concluded that "requiring the permit in this case appears to us to
rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." Id. at 3260. This holding
seems consistent with the theory that only "public values," not just any reason, must be
rationally fostered by legislative classifications. See id. at 3261-62 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984); Sunstein,
Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SuP. Cr. REV. 127.
After Cleburne Living Center it is clear that a community's fear of the retarded is not a public
value that can justify a classification disadvantaging the retarded. Thus, Cleburne Living
Center indicates that, although a state legislature might have constitutionally sufficient reasons for not placing the retarded in group homes, if the legislature does decide to embrace a
policy of normalization, any steps taken at the municipal level to thwart the implementation
of that goal will be vulnerable to constitutional attack. This outcome bears some resemblance
to the concept of "structural due process" or "due process of lawmaking," which suggests
that judicial scrutiny of a public policy ought to depend in part upon how broadly based and
democratically legitimate is the entity that adopted the policy as well as upon how carefully
that entity considered the relevant factors. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
548-54 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong. 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197
( 1976); Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REv. 1373 (1978); Sanda1ow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 269 ( 1975).
21. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir.
1984).
22. Id. at 1248.
23. I d. at 1249. The court cited a number of other decisions in accord with this conclusion. See id.
24. Chayes. The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281
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of scholarly writings has focused on institutional reform litigation.2s
From Chayes onward, most commentators have described this form
of public law litigation as raising sensitive issues of the legitimacy of
judicial activism. To some, this kind of lawsuit threatens the legislative prerogative of allocating scarce resources among competing
concerns and the executive prerogative of administering the law.2 6
Others stress the institutional advantages of judicial intervention.
For example, Chayes suggests that the parties can adequately present the relevant information upon which a decision must be made
and that judges have some structural advantages over the legislature
and the executive branch: they are nonbureaucratic and insulated
from political pressure; unlike the legislature and executive branch,
they are obliged to respond to grievances; they can tailor flexible
remedial relief to fit particular problems; and they are "governed by
a professional ideal of reflective and dispassionate analysis of the
problem [and are] likely to have had some experience in putting this
ideal into practice." Yet he also raises some serious practical questions, such as whether the disinterestedness of the judge can be sustained when the judge "is more visibly a part of the political
process," whether the unspecialized trial judge can handle the complex issues in such cases, and whether the insensitivity of the legislature or the bureaucracy to a particular problem "represents a
political judgment that should be left undisturbed." Moreover,
Chayes notes that "although courts may be well situated to balance
competing policy interests in the particular case, if as is often true
the decree calls for a substantial commitment of resources, the court
has little basis for evaluating competing claims on the public
purse."21
Does The Willowbrook Wars inform this debate? In some ways
this case was typical of the institutional reform genre. Plaintiffs
were suffering grievous harm on account of the state and had no
(1976) (hereinafter cited as Chayes I]. Professor Chayes has updated and revised his views.

See Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982).
25. Current bibliography may be found in 0. FJSS & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS
827-30 (2d ed. 1984); Levine, supra note 17; Levine, Calculating Fees of Special Masters, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 141, 142 n.5 (1985).
26. See, e.g., Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978);
Horowitz, The Judiciary: Umpire or Empire?, 6 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 129 (1982); Mishkin,
Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978); Nagel, Separation
of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1978).
27. Chayes I, supra note 24, at 1307-09. There have been some attempts to answer
these questions empirically. See. e.g., M. REDELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1982). But see
Levine. Book Review, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1983) (questioning some results of M. Rebell
& A. Block on methodological grounds).
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hope of obtaining legislative relief. Remedial relief was achieved by
a consent decree, not through a judicial order imposed upon the
parties. As has happened elsewhere, the parties negotiated the consent decree against the backdrop of a judicial finding of liability and
the threat of an imposed remedy. Moreover, under the decree the
court, through a monitoring panel, had ongoing responsibilities to
ensure compliance. More in reaction to the judicial affront to its
power than to the scandalous conditions at Willowbrook, the legislature reasserted itself at a later stage. Finally, the appellate court
curbed what it took to be some undue judicial activism by the district court. In the end, according to the Rothmans, the litigation
benefited a great many people and irreversibly altered public policy
in New York.
As exemplified by Willowbrook, the life cycle of institutional
reform litigation has very little to do with constitutional theory.
Scholarly articles often present constitutional law as a majestic process in which neutral and highly skilled judges discern enduring
principles through a combination of deep knowledge of key legal
precedent, rigorous philosophical inquiry, historical sensitivity, and
appreciation for modem social concerns. What turns the tide in
institutional cases, however, is not grand theory but fact-cold,
hard human suffering on a level no judge with even minimal sensibilities can abide. As the Realists saw long ago, abhorrence of a
wholly unacceptable status quo comes first, and theory comes later,
if ever, and only as a peg upon which the court hangs its remedial
hat. The preachers of judicial restraint have a strong theoretical
point, especially when discussing federal court intrusion into state
prerogatives. However, it seems that the federal judge's oath to
abide by the Constitution includes, at least for many judges, an implied oath to abide by some minimum level of conscience. So it was
with Willowbrook; the Rothmans report that Judge Judd was loath
to impose institutional relief until he had seen Willowbrook for
himself. One gets a similar impression about the Alabama institutional reform cases not only from a reading of the opinions of Judge
Johnson but from a review of his commentary on the subject: the
facts spoke loud and clear, and theories were created to justify the
remedies imposed.2s
In the final analysis, institutional reform litigation forces a
policymaking partnership, in which the threat and occasional actu28. See Johnson. The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation. 32 ALA. L.
REV. 271 (1981 ); Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEx. L. REV.
903 ( 1976). For examples of cases where poor results may have been achieved because judges
refused to pay attention to such facts, see J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW
(1976).
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ality of judicial intervention can prod public officials to address
problems that have been neglected. We would not join those who
have labeled the judical activism in this setting as unprincipled.
Rather, it seems to us that it is more properly seen as nonprincipled:
the court's conception of fundamental human values, although
often not tied to a fancy constitutional theory, can upset a repulsive
status quo and compel public officials to take action. Because reform is frequently the result of consent decrees-to be sure, sometimes the outgrowth of judicial jawboning-the courts often need
not even attempt to dress up their value judgments in constitutional
garb in a written opinion. In such settings, the courts have left the
Land of Neutral Principles and have explicitly become ombudsmen
for the least powerful members of society.
Apart from its shaky legitimacy in the eyes of some influential
constitutional theorists, what's so wrong about a system that forces
society to remedy problems that otherwise would go unaddressed?
Perhaps nothing, if we can somehow be certain that the state officials are wearing the black hats and all the plaintiffs wear white
hats. Even then, the limited resources available to solve social
problems are spent in an ad hoc manner, depending on which group
brings which piece of institutional reform litigation. In any event,
in modern life things are rarely so clear. Willowbrook provides a
classic example: plaintiffs' counsel appeared to be attacking an
abominable institution and only asking for humane treatment of its
residents; yet their true goal was to close the institution, not to clean
it up. The Rothmans, who admit their own preference for deinstitutionalization, concede that the value of this concept was unclear
when counsel adopted it as their remedial goal. The Rothmans also
recognize that many persons in favor of improving life for Willowbrook residents were opposed to placing the severely retarded in the
community. It is no comfort that these disputes about the goals of
the litigation were resolved by plaintiffs' counsel, not by relatives or
legal guardians of the class members.
The Rothmans are surely correct in stating that these cases "by
their very nature have something of a runaway quality about
them."2 9 Consider these fundamental questions they raise:
Who has the right to speak for disabled persons, especially when, as in the case of
Willowbrook, the vast majority are unable to speak for themselves? The parentswho, until the expose, suffered from personal and political constraints that rendered
them immobile or who had never gone out to visit Willowbrook or their children?
The state-which had let the facility degenerate' The legislature-which made
budget cuts with impunity? The professionals-who accredited the institution even
29.

D.

ROTHMAN

& S.

ROTHMAN,

supra, at 359.
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at its most inhumane?30

That the attorneys ended up with this authority largely by default is
certainly no reason to believe that their vision of a better world particularly deserved to be presented to the court, especially as the unified position of the class.31 The Rothmans' ultimate conclusionthat "no mechanisms exist, beyond the court itself, to ensure that
the public interest is being served"32-is surely as true as it is disturbing. And even in the glow of hindsight, plaintiff counsels' (and
the Rothmans') belief that across-the-board deinstitutionalization
was in the public interest can be sharply criticized, as it has been for
example by Joel Klein, an attorney who frequently represents parents in reform litigation involving the institutionalized retarded.33
Even with all of these problems, Willowbrook was in one sense
an "easy" case: the facts spoke for themselves and begged for some
sort of relief. Many harder cases can be imagined in which a state
institution is doing an arguably respectable job, but plaintiffs (or
their attorneys) believe it has not embraced the most modem or
effective techniques.34 It is difficult to find any supportable rationale
for judicial intervention when reputable and credible experts plausibly defend the institution's policies and practices and the facts do
not evoke the deep emotional reaction of a Willowbrook.35

III
For both students of constitutional law and of institutional reform litigation, The Willowbrook Wars is a useful case study. The
book provides a good, hands-on appreciation of what happens when
lofty constitutional arguments are applied in the real world in an
30. /d. at 63.
31. See generally Garth. Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective,
77 Nw. U.L. REV. 492 (1982); Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv.
1183 (1982) (discussing the ethical problems facing class counsel).
32. D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, supra, at 360.
33. Klein's critique is contained in his excellent book review of The Willowbrook Wars,
which is found in THE NEW REP., Feb. 4, 1985, at 28-32. For a collection of other sources
suggesting that community placement is not always the answer, see New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d at 971 n.l9.
34. For example, M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 27, at 147·74, describe an unsuccessful attempt to convince a federal court to find the defendants in violation of the Constitution for failing to adopt a novel educational theory that would have required an extensive
bilingual-bicultural program for Chicano school children in a rural Colorado school district.
If adopted, this wholly untested theory would have required the defend~nts to furnish such
services as extensive health care, clothing, and legal representation as part of the remedial
education program.
35. Moreover, in striving to ensure that the institutionalized are treated as people,
courts and reformers alike ought not forget that defendants in such cases are people as wellpeople who are often well intentioned and who have professional reputations that can be
sullied, at least in some circles, by a weak case as well as a strong one.
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effort to help disadvantaged persons. The Rothmans do not fully
address the many theoretical and empir' cal issues surrounding institutional reform litigation generally, but they ought not be criticized
on that score, because that is not what they set out to do. Besides, it
would be hollow to critique them in this way when no scholar in the
law or the social sciences has ever satisfactorily accomplished that
goal. It is also somewhat beside the point to attack them for expressing a rather clear bias in favor of deinstitutionalization, since rarely
can scholarly observers be free from strong opinions when the subject of their inquiry is something as emotionally charged as Willowbrook. We are certainly better off when observers forthrightly
present their biases and beliefs along with their findings, rather than
attempt to pose as disinterested scholars or experts.36 So long as
readers remain aware of both the authors' objectives and their perspectives, they will find much to be learned in The Willowbrook
Wars.

36. For one example of a situation where the experts were not so willing to be forthright
about their perspectives and biases, see A. LEVINE, LoVE CANAL: SciENCE, POLITICS AND
PEOPLE 133-73 (1982) (describing role of ostensibly disinterested scientists, who actually had
undisclosed conflicts of interest, in evaluating whether victims of the Love Canal disaster had
suffered impairment to their health).

